More on  Discounts  Under New York\u27s Banking Law: Antiquarian Research Inspired by Contemporary Legislation by Bishop, Joseph W., Jr.
MORE ON "DISCOUNTS" UNDER NEW YORK'S BANKING
LAW: ANTIQUARIAN RESEARCH INSPIRED BY
CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATION*
JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR.t
PRACTITIONERS and professors of corporate law have frequent occasion to
observe, with varying degrees of irritation, resignation and, sometimes, amuse-
ment, that the corporation laws of a number of states resemble patchwork
quilts of antique scraps-here a swatch of Uncle Eben's red flannels, there a
snippet of great-grandmother's bridal gown, yonder a section of Cousin Prud-
ence's bloomers. Perhaps an old house (usually dating from about 1840) makes
a better simile, an edifice to which improvements, extensions and excres-
cences have been periodically added, without any attempt at basic structural
change. Occasionally, one of the modem improvements blows the wiring or
brings down part of the roof. The inmates promptly bawl for the legislative
carpenters and repairmen, and, after a spell of furious and frequently unskilled
tinkering, business life goes on more or less normally, until the next catas-
trophe.
These venerable and crazy structures are by no means confined to the back-
woods; the corporation laws of the greatest of all commercial states, New
York, constitute an outstanding example.1 A particularly instructive instance
of the alarming manner in which an ancient and partially forgotten contrivance
can suddenly heave and tremble, and of the dubious value of hastily impro-
vised repair, is furnished by the history of a New York decision, Miller v.
Discount Factors, Inc.,2 and its legislative aftermath. In that case, the state's
highest court, construing a statute enacted in the infancy of the Republic for
the principal purpose of protecting chartered banks from competition, applied
the law in such a way as to tarnish the gilt edges of several billion dollars'
worth of entirely modem securities.
MILLER'S DISEASE
In February 1953, the Philip Freeman Company, a corporation engaged in
the uninspiring but sometimes profitable business of jobbing plumbing sup-
plies, felt the need of cash. Apparently because the company's credit standing
would not have commended itself to a bank, Freeman turned to other, more
venturesome, sources of capital. One such, located through the kindly offices
*N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, chs. 990, 991.
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Living with the New York corporation laws has become so inconvenient and un-
comfortable that the State Bar Association, alarmed by the business exodus to Delaware
and other streamlined states, is vigorously urging a general revision. See, e.g., A Look
at Corporation Law Revision, 29 N.Y.S.B. Buu.. 71 (1957).
2. 1 N.Y2d 275, 135 N.E2d 33, 152 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1956).
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of a note broker, was Discount Factors, Inc., a New York stock corporation.
Although Discount did not pretend to the dignity of a bank, it habitually
stepped in where bankers feared to tread; its business was somewhat euphe-
mistically described by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court as "the granting of financial assistance to merchants by lending money
and taking back notes or buying their paper"-for a price. In substance, Dis-
count lent $14,325 to the Freeman Company and received as evidence thereof
five promissory notes of the latter, payable one per month for five months. The
principal amount of each was $3,000, each bore six per cent interest, and each
was endorsed by Miller, the brother-in-law of the borrower's president.
4 It
will immediately be apparent to the arithmetically minded reader that Dis-
count's compensation equalled the swingeing rate of twenty-four per cent per
annum, or would have if Discount could have collected it.5
The transfusion failed: Freeman Company languished and languishing did
die. The endorser, Miller, having paid the first three notes to mature and evi-
dently wearying of paying for oats consumed by a dead horse, took counsel
to discover whether, somewhere in the laws of New York, there might not be
a way out of his distasteful predicament. The upshot was that he refused to
pay notes four and five on the ground that they had been discounted in vio-
lation of section 131 of the Banking Law, which barred corporations that were
not banks from "making discounts," and were therefore void.( Worse, he
3. Miller v. Discount Factors, Inc., 285 App. Div. 772, 777, 141 N.Y.S.2d 140, 144-45
(1955), modified, 1 N.Y.2d 275, 135 N.E.2d 33, 152 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1956).
4. Actually, the Freeman Company received only $13,825 in cash. Discount withheld
$675, variously described as a "discount charge," "premium" and "bonus charge," and paid
an additional $500 to the note broker. Miller v. Discount Factors, Inc., 285 App. Div. 772,
774, 141 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141-42 (1955). Since the latter payment discharged an obligation
of Freeman Company, that corporation may be said to have received $14,325.
5. Usury was not an issue in the case, since the maker of the notes was a corpora-
tion; in New York, a corporation cannot defend on the ground of usury. N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAw § 374. Nevertheless, had it not been for the pervasive odor of usury about the trans-
action, it is conceivable that the court of appeals might not have applied the law to Dis-
count with such savage literalness.
6. Prior to April 25, 1958, that section provided in pertinent part that:
No corporation, domestic or foreign, other than a national bank or a federal re-
serve bank, unless expressly authorized by the laws of this state, shall employ any
part of its property, or be in any way interested in any fund which shall be employed
for the purpose of receiving deposits, making discounts, receiving for transmission
or transmitting money in any manner whatsoever, or issuing notes or other evi-
dences of debt to be loaned or put into circulation as money. All notes and other
securities for the payment of any money or the delivery of any property, made or
given... to secure the payment of any money loaned or discounted by any corpora-
tion or its officers, contrary to the provisions of this section shall be void.
Any argument that an ordinary business corporation might be authorized by law to
make discounts was foreclosed by the complementary provision of § 18 of the General Cor-
poration Law, which stated inter alia that:
No corporation, domestic or foreign, other than a corporation formed under or
subject to the banking laws of this state or of the United States, and except as
(Vol. 68:269
NEW YORK BANKING LAW
brought suit to recover what he had paid on notes one, two and three, on the
ground that payment had been made under a mistake of law. 7
The trial court sustained Miller's defense as to notes four and five, but an
unsympathetic jury found that he had paid one, two and three voluntarily and
with knowledge of his rights. On appeal, he fared still worse, for the appellate
division reasoned that, since no "interest," eo nontine, but only a "bonus," had
been deducted in advance, it was questionable whether the transaction was a
discount at all. Moreover, the rate would have been illegal if charged by a
bank.8 "It is the combination of circumstances here, the loan being beyond that
possible by a bank, and the fact that there was no deduction of interest in ad-
vance, which takes the transaction out of the realm of encroachment on a
bank's business and removes the prohibition of the statute."9
Such reasoning invited reversal. It got it. The New York Court of Appeals
conceived the question before it in the simplest terms: "whether under the
facts in this case the instant transaction . . .avoids the prohibition of section
131 of the Banking Law, because only a so-called bonus charge, and not the
interest provided for on the face of the notes, was deducted when the loan
was made."' So stated, the question practically answered itself. Five of the
seven judges had no trouble whatsoever in finding that the "bonus charges"
were actually a part of the compensation for the loan and therefore constituted
interest; therefore, their deduction in advance was the making of a discount;
therefore, the notes were invalid. Q.E.D. The majority made equally short
work of the more ingenious but still unappealing idea that the way to take a
discount out of the scope of section 131 was to charge a rate of interest that
would have been usurious if levied by a bank. The court reversed the appellate
division as to notes four and five and affirmed it as to one, two and three-
"not, however, upon the ground that the notes in question were valid."'"
I do not wholly share the outraged reaction of many commentators to the
Miller case; I happen to think, for reasons which will appear, that on its facts
the result in that case is defensible. To be sure, the Banking Law's arbitrary
distinction between deducting interest in advance and collecting it as it is earned
therein provided shall by any implication or construction be deemed to possess the
power of carrying on the business of discounting bills, notes or other evidences of
debt, of receiving deposits, of buying and selling bills of exchange, or of issuing
bills, notes or other evidence of debt for circulation as money, or of engaging in any
other form of banking ....
7. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 112-f.
S. As a general rule, under penalty of forfeiting the entire interest, a New York bank
may not charge more than 6% per annum on a loan. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 108. The 6%
may be deducted in advance, which, of course, effectively increases the rate, depending ol
the schedule for repayment of the principal. But no arithmetical legerdemain could raise
legal bank interest to any such height as 24%.
9. Miller v. Discount Factors, Inc., 285 App. Div. 772, 777-78, 141 N.Y.S.2d 140, 145
(1955).
10. 1 N.Y.2d at 279, 135 N.E.2d at 36, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
11. Id. at 283, 135 N.E.2d at 39, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 280. The dissenters wrote no opinion.
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is economic nonsense.1 2 But that is the fault of the legislature, not the court.
On its face, without consideration of its history or prior construction, section
131 certainly forbade the making of discounts by corporations other than
banks; equally clearly, it voided "all notes and other securities . . .made or
given to secure the payment of any money ... discounted by any corporation
• . . contrary to the provisions of this section." According to the common
understanding of courts, lawyers, bankers and businessmen, the word "dis-
counting" precisely describes the lending of money with interest deducted in
advance.'3 It is not easy (although it is far from impossible) for a court to
conjure away the plain English meaning of statutory language.14 In the second
place, even if the statute were construed less mechanically, with more effort to
find what the legislature actually intended, it could plausibly be argued that
the facts of the Miller case really did present the sort of evil intended to be
scotched: Discount Factors was engaged solely in a business which might be
described as "banking" and had made a number of loans like those to the
Freeman Company.15 If the court of appeals had carefully confined its decision
to the facts before it, or had simply reversed per curiam, the financial world
would have little noted nor long remembered what it said. Instead, the major-
ity employed reasoning, and clothed that reasoning in language (with plenty
of italics for emphasis), which impelled a nearly contemporary commentator
to compare the case to the explosion "in thickly populated financial circles [of]
a time bomb."'16 The perturbation in the vicinity of Wall and Broad Streets.
12. See Kripke, Illegal "Discounts" by Non-Banking Corporations in New York, 56
CoLum. L. REv. 1183, 1190-95 (1956).
13. See, e.g., Evans v. National Bank, 251 U.S. 108, 113 (1919) ; National Bank v.
Johnson, 104 U.S. 271, 276 (1881) ; Fleckner v. Bank of the United States, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 338, 350 (1823) ; Philadelphia Loan Co. v. Towner, 13 Conn. 249, 259-60 (1839) ;
Atlantic State Bank v. Savery, 82 N.Y. 291, 302 (1880) ; City Bank v. Bruce, 17 N.Y. 507,
515 (1858). A century ago, indeed, the deduction of interest in advance seems to have
been so much the normal method of lending money that the terms "loan" and "discount"
were used more or less interchangeably. See People v. Bartow, 6 Cow. 290, 294 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1826) ("The discounting of notes is, undoubtedly, the principal business of a bank-
ing institution."); cf. 1840 N.Y. BANK COaM'Rs ANN. REP. 5, 13; 1841 N.Y. BANK
CoMM'Rs ANN. REP. 10-12; REPORT OF THE COMMiTTEE ON BANKING AND INSURANCE
COMPANIES 8 (N.Y. Sen. Doc. No. 27, 1835). Prior to the Miller case, in fact, some of
the inferior courts of New York seemed to see little difference between loans and discounts
for the purposes of § 131. Cf. Proper Spirit Trading Corp. v. Schilowitz, 140 Misc. 171,
172, 250 N.Y. Supp. 118, 120 (App. T. 1931); Voluntary Ass'n, Inc. v. Goodman, 137 Misc.
388, 390, 244 N.Y. Supp. 328, 330-31, (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1930).
14. See, e.g., Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 338 (1941).
15. See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
16. Kripke, supra note 12, at 1183. The author added, however, that the explosion was
likely to cause more nuisance than real injury. Ibid. Elsewhere the decision was said to
have "staggered the financial and commercial mechanism." Kupfer, Prohibited Discounts
Under the Banking and General Corporation Laws: The Impact of Hiller v. Discount
Factors, Inc., 12 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 30 (1957) ; see New York Credit Men's Adjust-
ment Bureau, Inc. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., 253 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1958).
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in the city, county and state of New York, can best be understood in the light
of some representative excerpts from the opinion:
The pertinent statutes . . . plainly forbid all discounts. In this case Dis-
count ... used its funds and deducted in advance the larger part of its
compensation .... This was the exercise of a banking power prohibited
by section 18 of the General Corporation Law, and, no matter what the
sum deducted is called, and no matter what the percentage retained, it was
the making of a discount which is invalidated by section 131 of the Bank-
ing Law.
.... The authorization to lend money in said section 18 [of the Stock
Corporation Law 17] does not entitle a domestic corporation, not organ-
ized under the Banking Law, to discount negotiable paper .... [I]t is the
lending of money, and the deduction of the compensation for the loan in
advance, from notes given to secure repayment thereof, that is prohibited
by section 131 of the Banking Law .... Discount could have made a loan
and charged any rate of interest that was agreed upon, but if the loan is
evidenced by promissory notes, and the charges therefor are deducted in
advance, in whole or in part, it transgresses the Banking Law.
It is also no answer to urge that even if there were a discount of in-
terest, the notes are still valid because Discount was not carrying on any
other banking operations, but was merely exercising a single power also
exercised by banks of discount. The prohibitions of both section 18 of the
General Corporation Law and section 131 of the Banking Law are phrased
in the disjunctive, and no corporation may be deemed to possess the power
to discount notes or do any of the other acts prohibited by said statutes.
If such corporation does make discounts, all notes so discounted are void,
Banking Law, § 131.
.... [T]hese five notes were discounted in contravention of section 131
of the Banking Law and are therefore void.'8
This language obviously made painful reading for "commercial finance com-
panies" of Discount Factors' ilk. Even had the opinion been explicitly limited
to such lenders, it would still have created some stir, for these entrepreneurs
play a considerable role in the financing of that populous class of corporations
whose paper is not attractive to conservative lenders. 9 But few of the acute
and well-feed gentlemen who cluster at the lower end of Manhattan Island
would have lost much sleep over the troubles of Discount Factors or its con-
geners. What caused the expenditure of a good many thousand hours of very
expensive legal time was the ease with which the court's language could be
applied to transactions commonly engaged in by large, conventional and repu-
table suppliers of capital. For example:
17. "Any stock corporation . . .may purchase, [or] acquire . . .bonds, notes . . .of
any person ... or corporation ... if authorized in its certificate of incorporation ......
18. 1 N.Y.2d at 281-83, 135 N.E.2d at 37-38, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 279-80.
19. See GUTHUANN & DOUGALL, CoRPoRATE FINANCIAL POLICY 445-50 (3d ed. 1955).
Some of the transactions of Discount Factors' bigger brothers involve sums which are by
no means contemptible. See, e.g., Bellanca Corp., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5706
(June 2, 1958). Bellanca borrowed $3,976,090 from The Mastan Company, described by
the Commission as "a commercial financing firm," for which it gave its ten-month note,
bearing interest at 6%, in the principal amount of $4,476,190.
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Corporations frequently try to gain face by making their bonds, deben-
tures or other evidences of indebtedness bear a lower interest rate than can be
justified by the corporation's credit. Payment of the remainder of the proper
interest rate is superficially concealed by issuing the bonds for less than par-
that is, at a discount.2 0 Many such issues have been placed with insurance
companies and other institutional lenders.
Part of a corporate underwriter's spread in the issue of new debt
securities may be attributable to its purchase of the securities for less than
par.2 1
Corporations of high credit often obtain short-term funds by issuing
their notes at a discount, sometimes through a commercial paper broker, who
resells to banks or other investors; sometimes directly to investors, who may
themselves be corporations. 22
Since New York is the financial capital of the nation, a very high percentage
of the foregoing transactions take place there and involve corporations incor-
porated or doing business there. It did not take much imagination to see that
each of these common types of financing might be described as lending money
and taking all or a part of the compensation in advance, and therefore as a
discount in violation of the Banking Law, so that the notes, bonds, debentures
or other instruments evidencing indebtedness so discounted might be void;
in fact, the less the imagination employed, the easier the operation. It might be
"inconceivable" that the court of appeals could "reach so fantastic a result" as
the invalidation of such instruments, 3 and it might also be true that "anti-
quarian research" would show that the statute had no proper application to
such transactions, 24 but large moneyed institutions and their counsel are no-
toriously allergic to doubt. There is an axiom of corporate finance to the effect
that nothing is so timid as a million dollars; in this case a good many billions
were involved. Obviously, the quick, clean and easy method of exorcising the
doubt was to amend the statute, and that without niggling delay. No time was
lost. It was too late to do anything in 1956, the court of appeals having been
so inconsiderate as to hand down its decision after the legislature had ad-
journed, but a frontal assault on the 1957 legislature produced rapid, if dis-
concerting, results. The Assembly and the Senate passed bills 25 which would
have deftly amended sections 18 of the General Corporation Law and 131 of
the Banking Law by adding to each the proviso that,
20. See 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 647-50 (5th ed. 1953). Some-
times an issue is sold at less than par because the issuer has miscalculated the receptivity
of the market.
21. 2 id. at 1056-57, 1089-90.
22. See GUTHMANN & DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLIcY 442-45 (3d ed. 1955);
Kripke, supra note 12, at 1185, 1195.
23. Id. at 1185.
24. Id. at 1186.
25. N.Y. Assembly Introductory No. 4045, Printing No. 4795, entitled "AN Acr to
amend the banking law, in relation to the prohibition on encroachment upon certain powers
of banks and trust companies"; A.I. 4037, Pr. 4297, entitled "AN AcT to amend the general
corporation law, in relation to the prohibition of the exercise of banking powers."
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The purchase or other acquisition on original issue or subsequent transfer
for less than the principal amount thereof or otherwise at a discount of
any evidences of indebtedness or other obligations for the payment of
money heretofore or hereafter issued shall not by reason of such discount
be or be deemed to have been a violation of the provisions of this section.
The Governor vetoed them.26
The grounds of the veto require, though they may not repay, close study.
After pointing out, correctly, that the bills were "evidentally [sic] intended to
remove any doubts as to the validity of some of the transactions to which the
[Miller] decision may be held to apply," Governor Harriman noted that the
amendments might "unduly remove safeguards which the law provides in con-
nection with practices that are considered as traditional banking activities."
Specifically, "the retroactive provision of the bill which makes it applicable to
transactions involving obligations for the payment of money 'heretofore or
hereafter issued' . . . raises a serious question, in that it would validate trans-
actions declared by the Court of Appeals to have been illegal when they were
consummated. ' 27 Finally, and with some justification, he denounced as a "trav-
esty" the legislative practice of rushing important bills through the last days
of a session,28 and remanded the amendments for "further study and ... public
hearings at which they may be thoroughly discussed and debated, with ample
opportunity afforded to groups representing banks, factors, other types of dis-
count companies and the public at large."
Gubernatorial vetoes are not the end of matters which agitate insurance
companies. At the 1958 session, the legislature again passed amendments.
There is room for doubt as to the amount of study and thorough public dis-
cussion they received. Since the amending bills constituted chapters 990 and
991 (out of a total of 992) of the Laws of 1958, it may be conjectured that
the legislature was not much more deliberate that year than it had been the
year before. If the Governor regarded their enactment as a travesty, he kept
it to himself, for he signed the bills. But at least it was clear that some atten-
tion had been paid to his veto message, inasmuch as the language of 1957 had
been altered in two significant respects. In the first place, the words "hereto-
fore or hereafter issued" had vanished.2 9 By way of compensation, the legis-
lature eliminated the old statutory penalty-that is, it removed from section
131 the sentence which explicitly made void all notes or other instruments
given to secure the payment of money that were discounted by a corporation
26. Memorandum filed with the bills cited in the foregoing footnote, N.Y. Legis. Serv.
Release, April 27, 1957.
27. It is not clear why there should be serious objection to this obvious purpose of the
bills. Possibly the Governor thought that if it is unconstitutional to impair the obligation
of a valid contract, the converse should be equally true-i.e., that the state cahnot impair
the invalidity of an unenforceable contract.
28. One bill was passed on March 25, 1957, the other on March 30, 1957, which was
the last day of the session.
29. Similarly, the words "be or be deemed to have been" were changed to "be or be
deemed to be."
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contrary to the provisions of the statute.3° There is no longer, then, a specific
penalty for violation of the statute; and that vacancy, as we shall see, may pose
the courts certain peculiar dialectic difficulties.
Certainly these obscure and fragmentary annals are far removed from the
sort of detailed and voluminous legislative history into which the Supreme
Court of the United States likes to sink its teeth. Nevertheless (deferring for
the moment the effect of deleting the statutory penalty), it is tolerably plain
that the New York legislature intended (if, pace the Governor, it had any
conscious intent at all) to leave with all their original infirmities evidences of
debt discounted prior to the date of approval of the bills. Indeed, they may be
rather more infirm than before, for now it can be argued that the legislature
has evidenced its endorsement of the Miller case by its solicitude not to "validate
transactions declared by the Court of Appeals to have been illegal when they
were consummated." And there's the rub. The securities thus left unhealed by
the sovereign's cleansing touch prima facie include every outstanding evidence
of indebtedness which was discounted in New York by an insurance company,
underwriter or other nonbanking corporation prior to April 25, 1958. For
them, the Miller case is still law-and, of course, some of these obligations
have very long maturities.
Moreover, the fears inspired by that case may be something more than bogey-
men conjured up by lawyers to frighten nervous clients. Needless to say, it is
in the last degree unlikely that the kind of corporation which can place a debt
issue with a group of insurance companies or float it through a reputable
underwriter would make a crude attempt to welsh on its obligations on the
strength of the Miller case; sanctions at least as strong as any known to the
law stand in the way of such an effort to turn a dishonest dollar. But it is not
hard to imagine contexts in which the affliction of securities with what may be
termed Miller's Disease might work real mischief to the interests of the holders
thereof. Suppose, for example, that the issuing corporation becomes insolvent:
no captious ethical considerations are likely to inhibit other classes of creditors
from taking the fullest advantage of any weakness created by the Miller doc-
trine; and the infirmity, if not fatal, might very well be employed to justify a
plan of reorganization much less favorable to the holders of the discounted
securities than the one which would have been required had their validity been
incontestable. 31 Suppose, again, for another example, that the issuing corpora-
30. See note 6 supra.
31. Cf. In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 61 F. Supp. 11. (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 149
F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1945). Corporation A had outstanding some $265,000,000 of debentures
whose indentures provided, inter alia, that A would not transfer its assets as an entirety
if that would impair the rights of the debenture holders. A thereupon transferred virtually
all of its assets to its subsidiary, B, in exchange for demand notes of B, which, in turn,
by a mysterious and disputed process, were transmuted into "collapsible" obligations of
B-i.e., obligations convertible into common stock at B's option. Howard Hopson, the pre-
siding thaumaturgist at this changing of wine into water, thereupon persuaded a sub-
stantial number of A's debenture holders to exchange their debentures for either a lesser
quantity of B's debentures or an equal quantity of lesser quality. The construction, validity
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tion, as issuing corporations often do, finds burdensome some of the protective
covenants-e.g., a restriction on dividends or investments-in the instrument
under which discounted securities have been issued. Though it may have no
intention of repudiating its debt, or even of overtly breaching its covenants,
the issuer's arguments as to the construction or applicability of those covenants
would assuredly be made more effective by the possibility that, in the last
analysis, the covenants simply are nullities and compliance with them an act
of grace.
Such possibilities as these, however unpalatable, cannot safely be ignored.
Unless the legislature returns to the subject, which is improbable, the conclu-
sion seems inescapable that the expenditure of time on research, antiquarian
and otherwise, for the purpose of ascertaining with some precision the impact
of the Miller case, will not be unprofitable.
The object of the exercise should be to furnish to future courts reasons,
better than those employed by the appellate division in Miller, for refusing to
apply to modem financial transactions an obsolete statute which the legislature
has elected not to kill but to leave in a sort of half life. The strongest argument
against extension of the Miller doctrine to discounting by institutional in-
vestors or underwriters is also the simplest: in the light of the history of the
statute, and the cases construing it prior to the Miller case, a court should
have no difficulty in finding that it was never intended to be applied to the
making of discounts by a nonbanking corporation as an incident to the conduct
of some other business.
ENTER THE ANTIQUARIAN
The history of the statute is long and in places obscure, but parts of it are
well known and can be summarized briefly. Prior to 1838, New York granted
charters to banking corporations only by special act of the legislature, and
granted but few of those.32 In part, the legislative purpose was the laudable
one of controlling the flow of bank notes circulating as currency, in part the
not so laudable one of reserving the lucrative privilege of banking for those
who had established some claim to legislative favor.33 As might have been
and enforceability of such protective covenants were then (and are now) very dubious.
Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 97 (1936). But the courts held that the possibility that A's deben-
ture holders might prevail in litigation based on an alleged breach of their covenants was
sufficient to make fair and equitable a compromise plan of reorganization which put the
A and B debenture holders on a parity with respect to B's assets.
32. The first bank chartered by the state was the Bank of North America, intended
to be a central bank like the Bank of England. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1782, ch. 35 (5th Sess.).
The act provided that "no other bank, public or private, shall be established within this
State during the present war with Great Britain," and in fact no state bank was incor-
porated until chapter 37 of the Laws of 1791 created the Bank of New York. Consolidator's
Notes-Baning Law of 1909, N.Y. BANKING LAW pt. I, at 2-3.
33. "The object of these enactments [i.e., the progenitors of § 131 of the Banking
Law] ... was to protect the chartered banks in the monopoly of banking, and to exclude
other corporations, associations or individuals from conducting a banking business in
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expected, mere denial of legislative charters to those who could neither seduce
nor hoodwink 34 the legislature proved too weak a fence to keep the pigs out
of the clover. At least as early as 1803, groups of enterprising citizens were
growing fat in the banking business without benefit of legislative grants. The
first restraining act, the not very remote ancestor of section 131 of the Bank-
ing Law, was passed in 18 0 4 .'5 As learned contemporary counsel said in argu-
ment a few years later, "The intention of the [restraining] act is to be dis-
covered from the cause of making it. In 1803, certain associations were formed
in the City of New-York, to carry on banking business, without any charter
of incorporation for that purpose; and this act was passed in 1804."31 The Act
of 1804 provided in substance that "no person unauthorized by law shall sub-
scribe to or become a member of an association, institution or company, or
proprietor of any bank, or fund for the purpose of issuing notes, receiving
deposits, making discounts, or transacting any other business which incorpo-
rated banks may do or transact by virtue of their respective acts of incorpora-
tion." All notes and other securities given to such an unauthorized company
were declared to be void. Apparently the chartered banks still felt their mo-
nopoly insufficiently protected, for in 1818 the act was supplemented by an-
other which made it unlawful for individuals, as well as associations and cor-
porations, to "keep any office of deposit for the purpose of discounting promis-
sory notes, or for carrying on any kind of banking business or operations,
which incorporated banks are authorized by law to carry on." or to issue bills
or notes as private bankers, unless expressly authorized by law. A forfeiture
of $1,000 was decreed for every violation of the statute, but evidences of debt
which contravened it were not made void.37 In 1829, the Acts of 1804 and
1818 were re-enacted, without significant changes in wording, as part of the
Revised Statutes. At the same time, the legislature, still anxious to plug any
breaches in the wall surrounding its chartered monopolies, added a provision
-substantially identical to the second sentence of the present section 131(1)
of the Banking Law-to the effect that "no incorporated company, without
being authorized by law, shall employ any part of its effects, or be in any way
interested in any fund that shall be employed, for the purpose of receiving
either department, of issue, deposit or discount." Pratt v. Short, 79 N.Y. 437, 447 (1880).
Elsewhere the court referred to "the policy upon which the restraining acts were passed,
viz.: the securing of the monopoly to special favorites of the Legislature ...." Id. at 448.
See also Savage, J., concurring in New-York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely, 2 Cow. 678, 711
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
34. See note 45 infra.
35. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1804, ch. 117, re-enacted without change by N.Y. Sess. Laws
1813, ch. 71.
36. Nathan Williams, arguendo, in Utica Ins. Co. v. Scott, 19 Johns. R. 1, 3-4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1821). The legislature of 1804, like the legislatures of 1957 and 1958, seems to
have reacted to the plaintive cries of large moneyed corporations with the alacrity of a
tigress protecting her cubs.
37. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1818, ch. 236. See People v. Bartow, 6 Cow. 290, 293-94 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1826).
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deposits, making discounts or issuing notes or other evidences of debt, to be
loaned or put into circulation as money."38
By 1837, a new wind was blowing. The pampered darling of the legislature,
the bank monopoly, had become "intensely odious."39 In that year, the busi-
ness of banking (except for the issuance of circulating notes) was in effect
thrown open to everyone except corporations by the repeal of so much of the
1829 act as prevented "a person or association of persons not incorporated,
from keeping offices for the purpose of receiving deposits, or discounting notes
or bills."140 For the next hundred and twenty years the legislature made no
change in the restraining act that seems germane to the present inquiry.
4
'
Thus, after 1837, section 3 of the 1829 act, applicable only to corporations,
became the solitary restriction on making discounts-and in the next year
there was enacted a general law for the incorporation of banks. If the restrain-
ing act had a purpose any longer, it was only that of "restraining corporations
from exercising powers not granted by their charters" 4 2-- more exactly stated,
of compelling people who wanted to do a banking business in corporate form
to incorporate themselves as banks and subject themselves to regulation as
banks. That policy was supported by what is now section 18 of the General
Corporation Law, which provides, in essence, that no corporation not formed
under the Banking Law "shall by any implication or construction be deemed
to possess the power of carrying on the business of discounting bills, notes or
other evidences of debt, of receiving deposits, of buying and selling bills of
exchange, or of issuing bills, notes or other evidences of debt for circulation
as money, or of engaging in any other form of banking .... 43
38. N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, pt. I, ch. 20, tit. 20, § 3.
39. See Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 77 (1857). The decision, which runs to 289
pages, reviews exhaustively, and somewhat exhaustingly, the history of New York bank-
ing legislation from the earliest times down to its own day.
40. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1837, ch. 20.
41. The repeal act of 1837, note 40 supra, left an apparent anomaly: while it was now
lawful for an individual or unincorporated association to keep an office for the purpose of
receiving deposits or discounting notes, there was still a heavy fine for subscribing to or
becoming a member of such an association, or being "interested" in any bank or fund
created for any such purposes. In 1852 the editors of the Fourth Edition of the Revised
Statutes, Messrs. Denio and Tracy, apparently without any legislative warrant whatso-
ever, recast the 1829 act, as amended by that of 1837, into substantially the form in which
subsections 1 and 2 of § 131 existed immediately prior to the 1958 amendment. They
took considerable liberties with the text of the statute, presumably in order to express what
they took to have been the intent of the legislature of 1837 and to eliminate the anomaly
mentioned above. Not until 1882 did the legislature ratify their version-though it was
certainly treated as law during the intervening thirty years-by enacting it as part of the
new consolidated banking law. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1882, ch. 409. This is the sort of diffi-
culty which may have deterred lawyers and judges from engaging in the antiquarian re-
search which might have averted the great Miller panic.
42. Pratt v. Short, 79 N.Y. 437, 448 (1880).
43. Section 18 traces its descent to Part I, Chapter 18, Title 3, § 4 of the Revised
Statutes of 1829. It underwent no significant change until 1892, when the phrase "the
power of discounting bills" was changed to "the power of carrying on the business of dis-
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This modest policy certainly does not require that nonbanking corporations
be prohibited from discounting evidences of debt as an incident to the conduct
of some business other than banking-especially a business like that of under-
writing or insuring, which is itself heavily regulated. Moreover, there is good
legislative evidence that so sweeping a prohibition was not regarded as neces-
sary even to the original purpose of protecting chartered monopolies, and that.
if the legislature of 1804 loved the banks which it had created, it also had a
healthy respect for the rich and powerful merchants of New York City and a
corresponding reluctance to disrupt the ordinary operations of their counting
houses. That evidence, indeed, has long been deeply buried in obscurity; it
seems to have been wholly unknown to court and counsel in the Miller case.
But antiquarian research reveals that on April 10, 1804, the day before the
original restraining act became effective, the legislature passed an interpreta-
tive act, evidently intended to dispel much the same sort of alarm as that which
again struck the financial community a century and a half later. It is worth
quoting in full:
Whereas the chamber of commerce of the city of New York have, by
their respectful memorial to the legislature, expressed apprehension that
the bill passed both houses of the legislature at the present session, en-
titled 'an act to restrain unincorporated banking associations' may be so
construed as to subject individuals to inconvenient restrictions in their
usual commercial business and pursuits. Therefore, for the removal of
these apprehensions,
Be it enacted and declared, that nothing in the said bill contained, shall
be deemed or construed to prevent any person, association or company,
from transacting or pursuing any business other than such as companies
or banks, incorporated for the express purpose of banking, usually do or
transact, nor shall anything in the said act contained, be deemed or con-
strued in any manner or way to affect the incorporation in the city of
New York created by virtue of an act, entitled 'An act for supplying the
city of New York with pure and wholesome water'.44
Having passed this exceedingly interesting bill, the legislature proceeded to
bury it under the wrong headstone; it appears in the Session Laws of 1804 as
section IX of a chapter entitled "An act to incorporate the Columbian Friendly
Union Society in the City and County of Albany"--which helps to account
for the fact that it seems to have been disinterred by a court only once since
1804 and not at all since 1832. There is certainly a fishy odor about the
episode, the reason for which, even at this distance in time, may not be beyond
all conjecture. The clue lies in the cryptic final clause of the interpretative act.
That clause was intended to preserve the Manhattan Company, the present
counting bills." (Emphasis added.) N.Y. Sess. Laws 1892, ch. 687, § 19. In 1935 it was
amended to except from its scope, and that of the Banking Law, inter alia, "the business
of loaning money ... on bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, secured by deeds
of trust or mortgages upon real property or personal property situated in, upon or appur-
tenant thereto . . . ." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, cl. 905.
44. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1804, ch. 110.
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Chase Manhattan Bank, which had been more or less unlawfully engaged in
the business of banking since Aaron Burr and other equally enterprising men
had induced the legislature of 1799 to grant them a charter as a water com-
pany, with very incidental authority to employ its "surplus capital . . .in the
purchase of public or other stock, or in any other monied transactions or
operations not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of this State or of
the United States .... ,,45 The strong inference that the legislative friends of
Aaron Burr and the Manhattan Company were no more anxious to publish
their benevolence abroad in 1804 than in 1799, may explain the burial of the
interpretative act and its peculiar closing clause.
Whatever the cause of its rapid descent into oblivion, and whether or not
it was subsequently repealed by implication,46 the interpretative act throws a
flood of light on the intention of the legislature of 1804. That intent undoubt-
edly was to prevent unauthorized persons from conducting a general banking
business, and possibly to keep them from carrying on any part of a general
banking business, such as discounting, as an end in itself; but it was not to
binder the exercise of particular banking powers as an incident to the pursuit
of some business other than banking. There is nothing in the language of the
1813 re-enactment or the 1818 supplement to indicate any alteration of this
purpose. Eminent members of the contemporary commercial bar (and pre-
sumably their clients) so understood the purpose of the statute:
45. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1799, ch. 84. There is some dispute as to the extent, if any, to
which the Manhattan Company ever diverted its time or funds to the water business, or
any business other than banking. In modern times, the bank, dwelling affectionately on
its past, likes to claim that it did operate a waterworks and, as proof, has from time to
time exhibited sections of wooden waterpipe, of undoubted antiquity but dubious prove-
nance. A painstaking and usually reliable historian of the city states that the Manhattan
Company maintained a reservoir on Chambers Street until about 1885 and that as late as
1878 it had four customers, who "were regarded as something of a nuisance." HARLOW,
OLD BOWERY DAYS 127 (1931). On the other hand, in 1832 the Attorney General of the
state, in the course of an abortive effort to oust the company of its charter, alleged with-
out contradiction that "although a great number of citizens . . .had at all times since
[1799] ... been willing and desirous to... take... water ... on such reasonable terms
as should be demanded by the company, yet . . . the company had not at any time since
[1799] ... furnished ... any ... quantity of pure and wholesome water for the use of all
such citizens .... ." People v. President & Directors of the Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351,
357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. of Judicature 1832). At any rate, it is certain that the pumping of
water, in the literal sense, was never a preoccupation of the original directors or any of
their successors.
46. As noted, the restraining act of 1804 was re-enacted in 1813 without change, as
part of the revision of the laws iri that year. Note 35 supra. The repealing act of the
1813 session provided that all acts theretofore passed which came within the "purview or
operation" of any act passed during that session should be repealed. N.Y. Sess. Laws
1813, ch. 202. In the course of the quo warranto proceedings against the Manhattan Com-
pany, mentioned in the preceding footnote, the court raised, but found it unnecessary to
decide, the question whether the interpreting act fell within the "purview" of the restrain-
ing act of 1813, and was thereby repealed. People v. President & Directors of the Man-
hattan Co., supra note 45, at 391.
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[W]hat was the object of the restraining statutes? ... To prevent asso-
ciations being formed wholly or principally for banking business-not to
prevent other companies from doing any particular act which a bank
does.4
7
As to the restraining act, in order to bring a company within its pro-
visions, it must bank .... There must be a fund created and devoted to
banking purposes .... If you depart from this you will be driven to call
every act of discount or deposit an infraction. You would thus invade
every counting house in the city, and the operations of every monied man
in the community.... The act was levelled at private banks.... We deny
that here is any proof of our acting colourably as an insurance company,
in order to interfere with the banking operations of other companies.48
Admittedly, these statements, which were not contradicted by opposing
counsel or the court, were made before the Act of 1829 had added its specific
injunction against a corporation's employing any of its property for the pur-
pose of receiving deposits, making discounts or issuing circulating notes. But
it seems intrinsically improbable that the legislature suddenly decided to deny
to corporations, and only to corporations, the right to engage in transactions,
as an incident to some business other than banking, which competing partner-
ships or individuals might properly continue to engage in while conducting
such other business. It is much more likely that it simply intended to clear up
uncertainty as to the applicability of the restraining act to corporations. 49
47. D.B. Ogden, arguendo, in New-York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely, 2 Cow. 678, 684
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
48. S. Jones, arguendo, id. at 696-97. To similar effect see Martin Van Buren, aron-
endo, in People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. R. 358, 366-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818). Com-
pare Wigan v. Fowler, 1 Starkie 373 (K.B. 1816). An act of Parliament made it unlaw-
ful for any corporation, or association of more than six people, "'to borrow, owe, or take
up any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes payable at demand, or at any less
time than six months from the borrowing thereof, during the continuance of such said
privilege to [the Bank of England] . .. . " Ibid. It was argued that a demand note was
illegal and void because issued by a seven-man commercial partnership. Lord Ellen-
borough, remarking that "the construction contended for would have the effect of crip-
pling commerce exceedingly," held that "the protection meant to be given to the Bank was
against Companies of Bankers, and. . . it was not the intention of the Legislature to pre-
vent co-partners, who were not bankers, from ... drawing bills for the purpose of com-
merce." Id. at 374.
49. There seems to have been real doubt whether the Act of 1804 applied to corpora-
tions. Cf. People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. R. 358, 366-67, 372, 377-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1818) (argument of counsel). The word "company" in those days might well have been
thought to comprehend only on unincorporated association or a partnership; the legisla-
ture called a corporation a "body corporate," a "corporation" or an "incorporated com-
pany"-which latter phrase itself suggests that a "company" was not necessarily incor-
porated. The Act of 1818 extended its prohibition to a "body corporate" as well as in-
dividuals, but it barred only the keeping of an "office of deposit" for discounting and other
banking purposes. It would not have prevented a corporation from engaging in all or any
part of the banking business so long as it refrained from keeping an "office of deposit"
for that purpose. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1818, ch. 236; see People v. Brewster, 4 Wend. 498,
500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).
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Nor did the courts before the Miller case take the Draconian view that the
restraining act voided each and every instrument discounted by an ordinary
corporation; so far as the reports show, no case ever held void a note dis-
counted by a corporate lender which was not engaged in some form of banking
as an end in itself. Of the three leading cases decided under the Act of 1804,
two invalidated the notes of an insurance company which, in an enterprising
but unsuccessful effort to extend to the insurance business the principles which
the Manhattan Company had so successfully applied to the water business,
"used ... the liberties, privileges, and franchises of becoming proprietors of a
bank . . , for the purpose of issuing notes, receiving deposits, making dis-
counts, and transacting other business, which incorporated banks may do and
transact by virtue of their acts of incorporation, by investing in the said bank
and business the funds...., which the business of insurance... did not active-
ly employ."50 The third case involved a note which a genuine insurance com-
pany discounted, apparently as an incident to its proper business. The court
held the note void because usurious, but, for lack of evidence "that the funds
of that Company were created, not for the purpose of insurance, but for the
purpose of banking," the court rejected an argument that the discount violated
the restraining act.51 Nor, under the act as amended and incorporated in the
Revised Statutes, does there appear to be any case which condemned the dis-
counting of a note by a corporation that was not singlemindedly engaged in
some or all forms of banking.5 2
Concededly, the judicial test has not been simply whether the daily business
of the discounting corporation was indistinguishable from that of the average
bank. A number of courts, construing the restraining act in its various avatars,
have found violations when the offender resembled a bank only in that it car-
ried on the business of discounting.53 True, prior to 1956 respectable authority
could have been adduced for the proposition that (despite the disjunctive
50. People v. Utica Ins. Co., supra note 49, at 364; Utica Ins. Co. v. Scott, 19 Johns.
R. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821), rezld, 8 Cow. 709 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1826). The first case ousted
the company of its charter; the second held void a note which it was found to have dis-
counted, but was reversed on the grounds that the pleadings showed not a discount, but a
loan, which the company's charter authorized it to make.
51. New-York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely, 2 Cow. 678, 702 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824). Chief
Justice Savage dissented, being of the opinion that the restraining act was violated by any
exercise of a banking power by any person other than a bank. Id. at 711.
52. Cf. New York State Loan & Trust Co. v. Helmer, 77 N.Y. 64, 68 (1879)
("[Pilaintiff kept a regular office for discount and deposit, carried on a regular banking
business, discounted promissory notes and other commercial paper, bought and sold a large
amount of exchange ... [received deposits and paid depositors' checks], and, in fact, did
the ordinary business of a bank of discount and deuosit.") ; Pratt v. Short, 79 N.Y. 437,
444 (1880).
53. E.g., Yorkville Business Protective Corp. v. Friedman, 144 Misc. 325, 258 N.Y.
Supp. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Proper Spirit Trading Corp. v. Schilowitz, 140 ,Misc. 171, 250
N.Y. Supp. 118 (App. T. 1931); Common Fin. Corp. v. Balsam, 133 Misc. 512, 231 N.Y.
Supp. 656 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ; Gerard Commercial Corp. v. Pietrantonio, 133 Misc. 188, 231
N.Y. Supp. 493 (Sup. Ct. 1928); People v. Bartow, 6 Cow. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826).
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wording of the act) a corporation (such as a factoring company) whose prin-
cipal business was in fact the exercise of some banking power, such as dis-
counting, did not thereby necessarily employ its property in violation of that
statute.54 Although the Miller case took the starch out of this argument, the
crucial question of interpretation seems not so much whether the statute for-
bids making discounts "in a context unaccompanied by general banking opera-
tions"' 5 as whether it forbids making discounts in the context of some distinct
business which is clearly not banking, like insurance or underwriting. The
court of appeals virtually phrased the test in those terms in what was the land-
mark case before Miller.56 Unfortunately, having taken this broad and realis-
tic view of the statute's purpose, the court proceeded to shrink the significance
of its opinion, and facilitate the subsequent distinction of that case in Miller,
by resting its decision on the somewhat technical ground that acquisition of an
evidence of debt for less than par from someone other than the original maker
is not a "discount" but that very different thing, "purchasing notes at less
than their face value, apparently as a speculation."r' 7 However much it is to
be regretted that the court of appeals did not in that case stand squarely on
the ground that the discounter's principal business was one distinct from any
form of banking, the fact remains that, so far as may be deduced from the
sometimes cryptic opinions of the courts, no finding of a violation of the statute
has involved a corporation having any business other than discounting which
was substantial enough to be mentioned by the court. Pretty clearly, Discount
Factors itself had no other business. 58 Thus, nothing in the actual holding of
54. See Wolf v. Aero Factors Corp., 126 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 221
F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Meserole Sec. Co. v. Cosman, 253 N.Y. 130, 142, 170 N.E. 519,
523 (1930) ; cf. Pennsylvania Factors Corp. v. S. Oldman, Inc., 272 App. Div. 1049, 74
N.Y.S.2d 670 (1947). The Wolf case involved a note secured by a chattel mortgage, and
therefore, although interest had been deducted in advance, could be argued to be within
the 1935 amendment to § 18 of the General Corporation Law, which provided that engag-
ing in the business of loaning money on notes secured by mortgages of realty or "personal
property situated in, upon or appurtenant thereto" should not be deemed a violation of the
Banking Law. But the district court reasoned that a business corporation might "lend
money . . . without in any form conducting a banking business" and that "a factoring
business is not a form of banking business." Wolf v. Aero Factors Corp., supra at 877.
55. See Kripke, supra note 12, at 1188.
56. "The distinction must always be borne in mind between the exercise in a com-
mercial transaction of a power confided to a bank, and engaging in a form of banking."
Meserole Sec. Co. v. Cosman, 253 N.Y. 130, 139, 170 N.E. 519, 522 (1930).
57. Id. at 142, 170 N.E. at 523.
58. Discount Factors, Inc .... conceded upon the trial that it frequently entered into
transactions of the present nature. It agreed that the normal pattern of its business
was to make loans for which its charges were deducted in advance.... We do not
have any proof on the record ... showing to what extent, if any, it carries on other
activities by way of factoring or otherwise .... We think it is a fair appraisal of
the record on this appeal to say that Discount's business is the granting of financial
assistance to merchants by lending money and taking back notes or buying their
paper.
Miller v. Discount Factors, Inc., 285 App. Div. 772, 775-77, 141 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142, 144-45
(1955).
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the Miller case would bring within the condemnation of section 131 of the
Banking Law a corporation which, as an incident to the transaction of its
principal, nonbanking business, habitually discounts evidences of debt. 59 This
being so, a court so minded should have no difficulty-and should have had
none before the 1958 amendment-in distinguishing the case of Discount Fac-
tors from that of an insurance company or underwriter.
The fact that the New York courts never squarely decided the applicability
of the injunction against discounting to corporations which plainly were not
trying to be banks is in large part attributable to the variety and ingenuity of
the devices developed by a compassionate judiciary for the amelioration, not
to say nullification, of the stringent statutory penalty. Discount Factors was,
indeed, somewhat remarkable in devising a transaction which could not be fitted
into any of the exceptions. As one measure of relief already noted, the statute
was held to be inapplicable to an evidence of debt which had a "valid incep-
tion"-i.e., which was not discounted till it had left the hands of the maker.6
0
But even if a note were held to be void, all was not lost. The courts had
reached back to Lord Mansfield's time to find a precedent which demonstrated
that, by muscular construction, a statute 61 voiding "Notes, Bills ... or other
Securities.. . for any Money ... won by gaming... or lent ... to any person
or persons for gaming" need not interfere with the enforcement of such a debt,
on the reasoning that the lender was "intitled to recover upon the original
Consideration and CONTRACT by the Justice and Equity of his Case, exclusive
of any Assistance from the Bill of Exchange, and taking that to be a void
Security.' 62 In effect, the New York judiciary left an unlawful discounter
59. On a number of occasions the inferior courts of New York, in determining
whether an evidence of debt was void under § 131, seem to have phrased the test in the
language of § 18 of the General Corporation Law--i.e., whether the corporation was
"carrying on the business" of discounting, although the former statute denounces "making
discounts." Possibly the courts tacitly reasoned that since the mere making of discounts,
as distinct from carrying on the business of discounting, is a power not precluded by § 18
of the General Corporation Law, it was "expressly authorized by the laws of this state"
within the meaning of § 131. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Factors Corp. v. S. Oldman, Inc., 272
App. Div. 1049, 74 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1947) (plaintiff, though it purchased a trade acceptance
at a discount, was not "engaged in the banking business") ; Yorkville Business Protective
Corp. v. Friedman, 144 Misc. 325, 258 N.Y. Supp. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (plaintiff "engaged
in the business of making discounts"); Proper Spirit Trading Corp. v. Schilowitz, 140
Misc. 171, 173, 250 N.Y. Supp. 118, 121 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (plaintiff "employed its prop-
erty, or at least a part of it, in the business of making discounts") ; Common Fin. Corp.
v. Balsam, 133 Misc. 512, 231 N.Y. Supp. 656 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (plaintiff "had as a busi-
ness discounted notes"); Gerard Commercial Corp. v. Pietrantonio, 133 Misc. 188, 231
N.Y. Supp. 493 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (plaintiff "carrying on the business of discounting notes").
60. Meserole Sec. Co. v. Cosman, 253 N.Y. 130, 170 N.E. 519 (1930); Siebros Fin.
Corp. v. 190 W. Fourth St. Realty Corp., 231 App. Div. 722, 245 N.Y. Supp. 902 (1930),
aff'd mere., 256 N.Y. 586, 177 N.E. 151 (1931).
61. An Act for the better preventing of excessive and deceitful Gaming, 9 Anne, c. 14
(1710).
62. Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 1078, 97 Eng. Rep. 717-18 (K.B. 1.760). Lord
Mansfield's reasoning was initially applied to the restraining act in Pratt v, Short, 79
N.Y. 437 (1880).
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with an action for money had and received. By a somewhat similar line of rea-
soning, the courts concluded that a mortgage or pledge securing a discounted
note retained its vigor and enforceability despite a finding that the evidence of
debt was void 63 -apparently even where the mortgagor was a mere guarantor
or endorser, like Miller, so that no action for money had and received could
have been brought against him.64 Courts which were not troubled by the fact
that the restraining act voided not only notes but also "other securities for the
payment of any money . . , or made or given to secure the payment of any
money" which were discounted in violation of its provisions, found nothing
but confirmation of their views in the 1935 amendment of section 18 of the
General Corporation Law. This amended section modified the Banking Law
by providing that "engaging in the business of loaning money in this state on
bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, secured by deeds of trust or
mortgages upon real property or personal property situated in, upon or ap-
purtenant thereto .... shall not be deemed or construed to violate any of the
provisions of the banking law." ' The amendment referred only to loans, not
discounts, and at first blush its language might seem somewhat difficult to
apply to hypothecations of personalty unaccompanied by any mortgage of real
estate. Undeterred by these considerations, the court that most recently con-
sidered the proviso concluded that it merely codified the previous case law.
Thereupon the court enforced a chattel mortgage given to secure a series of
notes discounted by a nonbanking corporation which "in the regular course of
its business ... was the lender in many such transactions." 66 The court must
have presumed that the qualifying phrase "situated in, upon or appurtenant
thereto" was intended to exclude from the benefits of the exception mortgages
upon personalty situated on the high seas or suspended in mid-air.
Prior to the Miller case, still other limitations on the scope of the restrain-
ing act had at least been adumbrated. There were judicial intimations, one
from no less a source than Learned Hand, that the act applied only to the dis-
counting of "commercial paper."6 7 Although the meaning of that phrase is far
63. E.g., Pratt v. Eaton, 79 N.Y. 449 (1880); Williams-Dexter Co. v. Dowland
Realty Corp., 234 App. Div. 827, 253 N.Y. Supp. 987 (1931), aff'd men., 259 N.Y. 581,
182 N.E. 189 (1932) (court of appeals held insufficient in law the defense to an action to
enforce a mortgage that the note was void because discounted in violation of the restrain-
ing act).
64. E.g., Amherst Factors, Inc. v. Kochenburger, 4 App. Div. 2d 745, 164 N.Y.S.2d
815 (1957) ; Antipyros Co. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., 8 Misc. 2d 310, 165 N.Y.S.2d 976
(Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd nwin., 4 App. Div. 2d 941, 167 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1957) ; County In-
dustrial Corp. v. Francia, 5 Misc. 2d 602, 164 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd ime.,
4 App. Div. 2d 748, 165 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
65. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 905.
66. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., 253
F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1958).
67. See In. re Worth Lighting Fixture Co., 292 Fed. 769, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). See
also Antipyros Co. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., 8 Misc. 2d 310, 312, 165 N.Y.S.2d 976,
978 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd mere., 4 App. Div. 2d 941, 167 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1957) ; Royal
Diamond Co. v. Ostrin, 133 Misc. 555, 556, 232 N.Y. Supp. 223, 224 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
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from precise, in common parlance it certainly does not describe long-term
bonds or debentures. In any event, neither the "commercial paper" cases nor
any other case discussed in this Article dealt with the acquisition at less than
par of bonds or debentures with long maturities, such as are commonly handled
by insurance companies and underwriters. A similar construction seems to
have been given by the Pennsylvania courts to a constitutional provision of
that commonwealth which imposed special conditions on the creation of cor-
porations with "banking or discounting privileges." 68 There, in a suit by an
insurance company to enforce an assessment, one of the defenses was that the
corporation "claims to exercise discounting privileges" in violation of the con-
stitution and bad therefore forfeited its franchise. But the court held that "dis-
counting," as used in the constitutional provision, "is to be confined to dealing
in promissory notes, bills of exchange or negotiable papers, for less than their
face" and did not comprehend "the investment of money by . . . insurance...
or other corporations, in stocks, loans, bonds, mortgages and ground rents at
less than their par value." 69 An early New York decision even suggested that
the acquisition of such securities from the issuer at less than face value, with
the intention of reselling them at a profit-as is the practice of underwriters,
if not insurance companies-was not "discounting" at all.70 It must be con-
ceded, however, that distinctions based on the length of maturity of the security
discounted, or the intentions of the discounter (not to mention other, less
plausible, circumventions of the statute),71 are not very easy to maintain in the
face of the sweeping language of the Miller case.
Nevertheless, the efficacy of the principal palliatives-the concept that the
obligor is always liable for money had and received and the allied notion that
the validity and enforceability of a mortgage or other security are independent
of the validity of the evidence of debt which it secures-seems not to have
been weakened by the Miller case.72 That decision, naturally enough, sparked
68. PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 25 (1838).
69. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Newcomb, 1 Leg. Chron. 9, 10-11 (Pa. C.P. 1872).
70. Talmage v. Pell, 7 N.Y. 328 (1852). A bank had purchased Ohio bonds from
that state, had given the bank's certificates of deposit, payable at a future date, and had
intended to resell the bonds at a profit. The court held the transaction beyond the powers
of the bank, on the ground that it did not constitute discounting: "In a word, they pur-
chased these bonds as they might have purchased a cargo of cotton, to send to market to
be sold at the risk of the vendor for the highest price that could be obtained." Id. at 344.
71. There was a hopeful, though short-lived, effort to develop a doctrine that a stock
corporation might lawfully discount the paper of its own stockholders; the practical effect
of this rationale would be to add to the discounts, investigation fees, bonuses and other
fees and charges a requirement that the unfortunate borrower purchase stock in the lender.
Businessmen's Mortgage & Credit Corp. v. Dobjinsky, 135 Misc. 628, 238 N.Y. Supp. 158
(N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1928); cf. Common Fin. Corp. v. Balsam, 133 Misc. 512, 231 N.Y.
Supp. 656 (Sup. Ct. 1928). Contra, Proper Spirit Trading Corp. v. Schilowitz, 140 Misc.
171, 250 N.Y. Supp. 118 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Voluntary Ass'n, Inc. v. Goodman, 137 Misc.
388, 244 N.Y. Supp. 328 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1930).
72. It is curious to note that in its original opinion in Miller, as reproduced in the
unofficial report, the court of appeals adverted to cases holding void "notes (or other
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a series of attempts by hopeful signers and guarantors of discounted notes to
utilize section 131 as a form of debtors' relief. An alert judiciary managed to
distinguish each and every one of these situations from Miller.73
This battery of exceptions and distinctions, though a monument to judicial
resourcefulness, and even capable of achieving substantial justice in many rela-
tively small and simple transactions, is, from the standpoint of an insurance
company, a good deal less than completely reassuring. Large institutional
lenders, of course, often purchase debentures that are wholly unsecured by any
hypothecation of property. The true security for such debentures lies in the
protective covenants which they contain, perhaps in a guarantee by a parent
or other corporation. But, as already suggested, if the debenture is void, it is
hard to see how its covenants can be valid and enforceable.74 As the Miller
case showed, the doctrine that the obligor of an illegally discounted note ought
to be liable for money had and received is of no avail against an endorser of
that note; and there is no pertinent distinction between an endorser and a
guarantor-unless, considering that rationality has not been a significant ele-
ment in the construction of the restraining act, it might be argued that a guar-
antee is a separate piece of paper, unaffected by the invalidation of the primary
obligation. For that matter, it is far from clear that interest, either at the con-
tract or legal rate, may be recovered from the obligor himself.75 Even if the
securities for the payment of moncy) discounted when a loan is made . . . ." 135 N.E.2d at
37. (Emphasis added.) In the official report the italicized language has vanished. 1 N.Y.
2d at 280, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 277. The, motivation of this surreptitious amendment pretty
clearly was a desire to scotch any inference that the decision overruled the cases that
held enforceable an instrument securing a note discounted in violation of the statute. See
New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Samuel Breiter & Co., 253 F.2d 675,
677-78 n.4 (2d Cir. 1958). But the intrinsic absurdity of that construction of the act is
pointed up by the fact that the offending phrase is a nearly verbatim quotation of the
statutory language.
73. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., supra
note 72 (enforcing chattel mortgage to secure payment of money actually received by
mortgagor) ; Amherst Factors, Inc. v. Kochenburger, 4 App. Div. 2d 745, 164 N.Y.S.2d
815 (1957) (holding both discounted notes and guarantor's mortgage valid) ; Antipyros
Co. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., 8 Misc. 2d 310, 165 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd
mem., 4 App. Div. 2d 941, 167 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1957) (mortgage and guarantee enforced) ;
County Industrial Corp. v. Francia, 5 Misc. 2d 602, 164 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1957),
aff'd mere., 4 App. Div. 2d 748, 165 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957) (endorser's mortgage enforced);
Mittman v. Kuo, 5 Misc. 2d 595, 160 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (mortgage enforced);
Empire Factors Corp. v. 1305 Brook Ave., Inc., 135 N.Y.L.J. 10 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (mort-
gage enforced).
74. To the extent that the covenants are contained not in the debentures themselves
but in an indenture or loan agreement under which they are issued and whose terms they
incorporate by reference, it might be argued that the indenture is a "security" analogous
to a mortgage and therefore endowed with independent life and enforceability. The argu-
ment is strained, but not much more so than the reasoning of the mortgage exception it-
self. Cf. Antipyros Co. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., supra note 73; County Industrial Corp.
v. Francia, supra -note 73.
75. It has been suggested that a recovery of money had and received would bear in-
terest at the legal rate "either from the date of the advance or the later date of demand."
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discounted evidence of debt is a bond secured by a mortgage, the lender, in
practice, may not be much happier, for the realizable value of mortgaged prop-
erty is frequently only a fraction of the amount of the debt which it secures.
Bond purchasers rarely put their whole trust in the security behind their
bonds; the protective covenants of bond indentures commonly -approximate
those of debenture indentures in both quantity and quality.
To make matters worse, it is arguable that the 1958 amendment to section
131 effectively knocked the props from uinder the rationale on which the courts
laboriously erected the right of the. unlawful discounter to recover money had
and received and to enforce a mortgage. The heart of that reasoning was the
hoary principle that where a statute prescribes a pound of flesh as penalty, the
courts will be astute to see that no drop of blood is shed:
In view of the special language of the restraining act, and the specifica-
tion of the consequences which should follow the unlawful discount of
commercial paper, there is great force in the suggestion that the Legis-
lature regarded the particular penalty imposed ... as a sufficient protec-
tion against corporations . . .unlawfully engaging in the business of dis-
counting paper, and that it was not intended that they should also forfeit
all claim to money loaned or advanced upon the prohibited security. 76
But the 1958 amendment excised the specific penalty for illegal discounting.
The net effect is that the discounting of an evidence of debt by a nonbanking
corporation prior to April 25, 1958 (the date of the prospective, healing
amendment), is-in view of the deliberate deletion of the retroactive provision
of the amendment-probably still illegal, albeit no definite penalty is placed
upon the illegality. In such a case it can-and probably will-be argued that
the courts must fall back upon "the general rule of law, that no right of action
can spring out of an illegal contract," a rule which "applies as well to con-
tracts mahm prohibitum, as to contracts malum in se."'77
And that is exactly what the court of appeals held a century ago in what
seems to be the only case involving an attempt to enforce a contract which
See Kupfer, supra note 16, at 36 n.12. But the cases throw little light on the question, or
on the allied question whether a discounter is entitled to recover the face amount of the
discounted note or only the amount actually received by the borrower. In Williams-
Dexter Co. v. Dowland Realty Corp., 234 App. Div. 827, 253 N.Y. Supp. 987 (1931), aff'd
mere., 259 N.Y. 581, 182 N.E. 189 (1932), the court, enforcing a mortgage of real prop-
erty which secured a note alleged to have been illegally discounted, rejected a claim that
the "bonus" taken by the lender, together with the interest paid on such bonus, should be
disallowed in the computation of the amount due the mortgagee. But in Pratt v. Short,
79 N.Y. 437, 449 (1880), which did not involve a mortgage, the court required only that
the defendants "restore the money which they received," which seems to imply that they
were not obligated for the face amount of the discounted note.
76. Pratt v. Short, supra note 75, at 448-49. To similar effect, see, e.g., Ernst v.
Terminal Clearing House Ass'n, 86 Misc. 295, 297, 149 N.Y. Supp. 181, 183 (Sup. Ct.
1914), aff'd iner., 167 App. Div. 902, 151 N.Y. Supp. 1114 (1915).
77. See Pratt v. Short, 79 N.Y. 437, 445 (1880).
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violated the restraining act but which was not an evidence of debt discounted
in violation thereof and hence was subject to no prescribed penalty. 78 In that
case, the plaintiff, an unincorporated association carrying on a banking busi-
ness in Montreal, entered into a contract under which one Brisbane, a resident
of New York, was to take plaintiff's bank notes and use them for the discount-
ing of notes in New York, the profits to be equally divided. Brisbane gave the
plaintiff his bond for the repayment of the sums advanced to him, and his
father, to secure the bond, gave the plaintiff a mortgage of real estate. Upon
Brisbane's default, and the plaintiff's attempt to enforce the mortgage, the
court held the contract illegal and void, because its execution necessarily in-
volved a violation of the restraining act,79 and therefore simply refused to "lend
its aid to a man who founds his action upon an illegal contract."8 0 It may be
assumed-though the Aliller case does not encourage the making of optimistic
assumptions as to the court of appeals' attitude when dealing with section 131
of the Banking Law-that the courts will not be noticeably eager to resurrect
the Brisbane case and apply it to evidences of debt unlawfully discounted prior
to April of 1958. Nevertheless, the next court to face the question must either
ignore, distinguish or overrule the Brisbane case if it wants to enforce a debt
evidenced by an illegally discounted note, debenture or bond. None of these
processes is likely to be particularly simple. It might be easier, as it would
certainly be more straightforward, squarely to decide the proper scope of that
statute in the light of its long and troubled history.
SUMMARY
In a nutshell, the 1958 amendments of the Banking and General Corpora-
tion Laws did not, in all probability, lay the ghost of the Miller case. However
unintentionally, those amendments may in fact have created totally new and
pestiferous problems. No doubt the statute could be amended again-and ought
to be. But any such return to the problem should involve considerably broader,
more painstaking and more painful thinking than the New York legislature has
shown any disposition to devote to it. Reconsideration should, for example,
include a real study of the exceedingly complex problem of regulating such
lenders as Discount Factors.8 ' The kind of regulation represented by the
Miller case resembles brain surgery with a cleaver. No less dangerous, on the
other hand, is the present amendment's failure to regulate a class of lenders,
however necessary, the exigence of whose clients is a standing temptation to
78. DeWitt v. Brisbane, 16 N.Y. 508 (1858).
79. The violation lay not in the discounting of notes but in the keeping of an office for
the purpose of issuing evidences of debt--i.e., the Canadian banknotes-to be put into cir-
culation as money. At that time it was not illegal for either an individual or an unincor-
porated association to engage in discounting.
80. DeWitt v. Brisbane, 16 N.Y. 508, 512 (1858).
81. See Miller v. Discount Factors, Inc., 285 App. Div. 772, 778, 141 N.Y.S.2d 140,
146 (1955).
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predacity. But the legislature, having solved the immediate problem to its own
satisfaction and hushed the cries of the insurance companies, is not likely to
embark soon on a project which is neither easy nor apt to return quick political
dividends. If there is no amendment, then sooner or later, most probably in
the context of reorganization or bankruptcy of a corporation some of whose
outstanding securities were discounted in New York prior to April 25, 1958,
by a nonbanking corporation, the problems herein discussed are going to be
raised. And when that time comes, antiquarian research into the history of
New York's restraining act will be necessary and, perhaps, profitable.
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